

**TOTAL RESPONSE
to
TOTAL STRATEGY**

**Toward Economic Recovery and Development in
Southern Africa
Report of the
North South Roundtable Consultation in Juliasdale,
Zimbabwe
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
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PREFACE

This North South Roundtable (NSRT) on Recovery and Development in Southern Africa followed 2 1/2 years after the start of the UNP programme of Action for Economic Recovery and Development and just over two years after the first NSRT on the Progress of African Recovery held in Bommersvik, Sweden in October, 1986. The purpose of the present NSRT on Southern Africa was to focus on the problems of a particular region - that of the nine SADCC countries, to identify what was needed to sustain and accelerate their development and to identify what the donor countries could do to support this process.

The meeting brought together participants from six of the SADCC countries, from S WAPO and the ANC, from two other Third World countries and from eight donor countries, five non-government organizations and three international agencies. Senior Minister Bernard Chidzero and I were co-chairmen of the meeting. Much of the meeting was planned in close cooperation with Mr. Nathan Shamuyarira, the Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe, who at the last minute was unable to participate, owing to the need for him to lead a delegation abroad.

What emerged overwhelmingly from the presentations and discussions is that a purely economic analysis of the current problems of southern Africa and a purely economic response to them is totally inadequate and inappropriate. The focus on the development problems of the region inevitably raised issues linked directly with South Africa - and the political and military dimensions of these links, in addition to the economic and social. Both the problems of the region and the solutions to them are integrally related to the situation and the present stance of South Africa, which by its conscious and openly declared policy continues to play a dominating and destabilizing role throughout the region. Though increasingly recognised in recent years, this perspective of a total strategy requiring a total response still only influences international action to a minor extent. The need for a 'total response' from the international community was one of the major conclusions of the conference.

This report draws on and summarises the issues, points and recommendations brought out during the discussion in Brondesbury Park. The report was put together following the meeting by the three rapporteurs in consultation with and on the authority of the two co-chairmen of the meeting, Bernard Chidzero and myself. While every effort has been made to bring out the differences of views as well as the points of consensus during the meeting, it must be made clear that agreement of the participants to the content of the report has not been sought and that it does not therefore necessarily reflect the views of all.

I would like to express special thanks to the Government of Sweden for the sponsorship of this consultation, to all those who participated in it, and in particular to Comlie Bryant, Phyllis Johnson and David Martin for serving so ably as rapporteurs.

Richard Jolly
Chairman, NSRT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The North South Roundtable of the Society for International Development is a leading international forum for dialogue on global development issues. In its second consultation on African recovery, held in Zimbabwe and focusing on southern Africa, the participants concluded that an integrated international response on several fronts by international organizations and governments is required to assist the region in meeting its vast potential, and that peace and stability are key to economic recovery in the region.

Southern Africa, like the rest of the continent, is caught in the squeeze of low commodity export prices, high import costs, burgeoning foreign debt and lack of industrialization, but the major causal factor crippling growth and development in the region is South Africa's apartheid policy and its related regional policy of economic and military destabilization.

While South Africa's neighbors have many common problems, these vary widely in the specific configuration of their development. However the overriding fact for the region as a whole is the economic integration of all of it, including South Africa. These connections have significant historical roots and hence the region must be analyzed as a whole and not, as often happens, without reference to a regional context for economic, political and security problems. The vulnerability of the region as a whole is bound up in the transportation network and traditional patterns of trade, and these are direct economic reasons for South Africa's interest in "transport diplomacy". The creation of the nine-nation Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC, with its stated aim of reducing the region's economic dependence on South Africa, and seen in Pretoria as a challenge to its regional predominance, has made significant advances in coordinating regional development, particularly in transport

The major finding of the Juliasdale meeting argues against piecemeal policies which purport to address one or another factor within the region. Major donors often have widely varying policies in relation to specific countries, policies which are either contradictory among themselves or contradictory when viewed in the context of the region or in relation to South Africa's behavior in the region. South Africa uses these contradictions to impede divisions within the region, among donors, and among international leaders, in order to maintain South African control over the netter and distribution of development.

An integrated "total response" from the international community must address the four components of South Africa's "total strategy": economic, political, diplomatic (information) and security. These components must be analyzed in response to the specific situation of each country and in relation to the reality of the region as a whole. Sanctions, for example, while essential to increase pressure on South Africa for an end to apartheid, are not in themselves a comprehensive response. An appropriate integrated response must include support for the neighboring states in terms of debt relief and development assistance, access to markets and new opportunities for trade, as well as emergency and security assistance. All of the above must be based on a clear understanding of the region and how it functions, to provide a backdrop to the rapidly unfolding events taking place. Toward this end a major public education policy is needed for the creation of informed international public opinion which will be less vulnerable to the silence imposed by South Africa's internal censorship and to its well-financed campaign of disinformation about its neighbors.

To mobilize an integrated international response to the multifaceted problems of southern Africa it is proposed that the United Nations and the World Bank exercise more leadership, each building upon their respective past involvement and organizational strengths.

For the United Nations, this leadership should mean a small office set up by the Secretary-General through his Special Adviser on Africa. Such an office, with its direct access to the Secretary General could serve as a catalyst and coordinator for a range of UN actions in southern Africa, including a major information programme monitoring destabilization and mobilizing pressure to stop it, Security Council consideration of sanctions, etc.

For the World Bank and SADCC, this should mean stepping up efforts to mobilize and coordinate major donor support for economic development and debt relief, strengthening each of the SADCC designated sectors, and deepening regional institutional capacity for policy analysis and management.

Toward these goals, and to deepen international understanding of the plight and problems of this region, there should be a major international conference on Global Support for Southern Africa.

The southern African region can become a potent instrument for economic transformation in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, given the wealth and diversity of its natural resources, the vast potential of its human resources, and the good physical and social infrastructure in many of its countries. The main obstacle to this vision of health and prosperity is South Africa's policy of apartheid and regional destabilization.

PART I

The Economic and Historical Framework

This North South Roundtable consultation on economic recovery and development in southern Africa took place in late 1988 against an international backdrop of economic uncertainty in which the gap is widening between the industrialized north and the developing south. Steady economic growth continues in the industrialized countries amid increasing intergovernmental cooperation in macroeconomic policy coordination. However, this growth has not been transferred to developing countries in Africa whose economies are plagued with low or stagnant rates of growth, declining per capita incomes, crippling debt service burdens, depressed export earnings and declining terms of trade. Historically low commodity prices are beginning to show hopeful, though hesitant and uneven, signs of improvement. Meanwhile, every 1 % rise in interest rates in industrialized nations results in an overall increase in debt services for developing countries of US\$5 - 6 billion.

The average real GDP growth for the SADCC region ranges from 3 - 6%. For some of the poorest countries in the region, growth rates in 1987 did not keep up with population growth which averages 3.2% per year. The region's debt stands at US\$18 billion with annual repayments on long term debt now well in excess of the 1985 figure of \$750 million. Infant mortality rates have worsened in several cases as the social consequences of deepening poverty and malnutrition take their role.

While the countries of southern Africa have many of these problems in common with the rest of the continent, each nation's economy and infrastructure are different in the specific configuration of their development. The overriding fact for the region as a whole is the economic integration of all of it, including South Africa. The regional transport network, trade and labour patterns, transnational investment linkages and supply systems all have significant historical roots; and hence the subcontinent must be analyzed as a whole and not, as often happens, without reference to a regional or historical context for economic, political and security problems. The creation in 1980 of the nine-nation Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), with the stated aim of increasing the region's economic independence, and seen in Pretoria as a challenge to its regional predominance, has made significant advances in coordinating regional development. Transport and communications have been a priority for SADCC because the prosperity of the region, and its vulnerability, is bound up in the transportation system and traditional patterns of trade. Six of the region's countries are landlocked, and access to the sea depends upon roads and railways running through neighboring countries. There are seven major rail arteries, two of which transit directly through South African ports. Sabotage of the alternative rail routes has ensured that most of the region's trade transits the southern routes, and has had devastating consequences far beyond the line of rail. The major causal factor crippling growth and development in the region remains South Africa's apartheid policy and its related regional foreign policy of economic and military destabilization. War by proxy continues virtually unabated. Over a million people have died directly or indirectly as a result of war, three million people have been displaced from their homes, countless wildlife and their habitat have been wiped out, regional and national infrastructure has been destroyed including desperately needed clinics, schools, roads, industrial equipment and port facilities.

Historical Context

At the Lusitania meeting, attention was drawn to the fact that the interdependence of states in the region is rooted in the planning and decision-making of one hundred years ago. Many policy makers centrally involved in financial and commercial activities of the late 19th century understood the role and function of financial intermediation reinforced by transportation infrastructure

Hence the sinews of rail, ports and roads which pulled together the movement of labour, goods and services to facilitate the capital accumulation within the growing cities and industries of South Africa at the turn of the century. While enough economic exchange could take place for some mutual growth to occur, this growth largely fueled the engine of South Africa's economy while countries lying outside its boundaries were excluded from the core of this growth.

Cecil Rhodes' reasons one hundred years ago for trying to buy Delagoa Bay, now Maputo, were similar to those manifested today in the sabotage of the railway line, only the polarities have changed. Rhodes, as Prime Minister of the British colony in Cape Town, was trying to curtail the independence of the Boer republics in the northern Transvaal by blocking their access to the sea, much as Pretoria tries to control its neighbors' access to the sea today through "transport diplomacy". The railway which reached the port of Lourenco Marques on 1 July 1891 on behalf of the Afrikaner Boer republics is now subject to sabotage in Mozambique by rebel groups supported by the ancestors of those same republicans.

The migrant labour system is another tie that binds the region together, historically and economically, in the recruitment of labour from neighboring countries to work in the South African mines. After slavery was formally abolished in South Africa, the divisions in society were institutionalized on a racial basis, leading to "pass laws" which enabled mining companies to bring in labour to live in rough hostels without their families for fixed periods and then send them away again. The colonial administration in the country of origin benefited from the migrant labour system through the remittance of part of the miners' income in gold. In Lesotho, when labourers moved from the production of food to the production of gold, their control of the process of economic exchange slipped outside the national boundaries. A current and common example is the image of a truck from South Africa offloading milk in a village in Lesotho, milk to be purchased by money earned in the South African mines. Even the jeeps which international agencies purchase for use in Lesotho are assembled over the border in Bloemfontein.

While the high percentages of imports into Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland from South Africa are often known, the reasons for those imports or the fact that South Africa buys few goods produced in these countries is less well known. There is little awareness of the economic history of this region and its current political and social consequences. Lesotho and Swaziland (and Namibia) remain part of the Rand monetary zone, and thus have far less control over monetary policy than most states do. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are members of the Southern

African Customs Union, controlled by South Africa and impacting upon the degree of freedom which these countries have in fashioning their trade policy and macro-economic policies. The geographical reality of states locked into financial, trade and communications systems whose functioning was frequently not in their interest is central to understanding the historical development of southern Africa. The chart below shows some of the regional ties that bind the seven SADCC member states most closely linked with South Africa. The figure shown for Zimbabwe's transportation via South Africa includes that which currently transits South Africa to Maputo port.

Table 1 Some principal features of SADCCJ South Africa links (per cent)

<i>item</i>	<i>Bot</i>	<i>Les</i>	<i>Mal</i>	<i>Moz</i>	<i>Swaz</i>	<i>Zam</i>	<i>Zim</i>
Transport via SA	90	100	60	30	70	60	90
Imports	90	90	45	10	90	20	20
Petroleum	100	100	Sig	Neg	100	Neg	Neg
Electricity	40	100	-	60	80	-	Neg
Customs revenues	20	70	-	-	60	-	-
Exports	8	40	6	4	40	1	20
Migrants (000)	30	140	30	60	20	-	10

• Share of total government revenue

Source' Chandra Hardy in Development Dialogue

Table 1 shows that those with the strongest economic ties to South Africa, and thus the most vulnerable, are Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. It clearly illustrates the transport dependence existing since South Africa, through various means, succeeded in diverting most of the region's traffic away from shorter and cheaper routes through SADCC ports to its own. The table shows that five countries are heavily dependent on imports of petroleum products and electricity, and also that the use of migrant labour remains substantial despite selected cutbacks in recent years. An important characteristic of the dependence of South Africa's neighbors is not only its size but its composition.

The data in the above table, however, cannot fully reflect the degree of regional dependence on South Africa, since this control manifests itself in many ways which are difficult to quantify. One is the involvement in the region of South African commercial and business interests which, through equity and management contracts, control virtually all industrial and mining activities in Lesotho and Swaziland, and a very high proportion in Botswana. Although less pervasive, substantial business links exist in value terms in Zimbabwe and Zambia, particularly in the mining sector.

Emergence of Apartheid and Destabilization

Apartheid as a policy reinforced early development patterns and the extraordinary inequality being produced, and redefined it into an ideology. Post-1948 South Africa saw the tightening of legislation of minority rule and institutionalization of a racial system of "separate development" in which the cities were decreed as white living areas with blacks allowed access only in a servile role. Black "homelands" were generally restricted to the least productive land in marl areas and were underdeveloped, under industrialized areas of extreme poverty from which the cities and mines could draw their labour.

In the 1960s, South Africa remained apart from the "wind of change" sweeping independence through the rest of the continent. The Portuguese colonial territories, the British rebel colony of southern Rhodesia, and occupied Namibia provided a "buffer zone" from the rest of Africa until the pressure of liberation wars in the Portuguese colonies precipitated a coup d'etat in the poorest of the colonial capitals in 1974. This led ultimately to the independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975.

Prior to 1974, South Africa's regional policy was concerned primarily with economic and military cooperation with the colonial administrations on its borders and with thwarting activities by liberation movements whose growth in strength was seen by Pretoria as part of an external onslaught involving boycotts, riots, and United Nations resolutions. After 1974, the face of southern Africa changed dramatically and South Africa began to reformulate its regional approach, adopting a strategy of economic and military pressure against its neighbors to try to create a new cordon sanitaire.

During the colonial wars, the Portuguese and Rhodesian administrations created or co-opted surrogate groups which were later inherited by South Africa. The historical evidence of this is confirmed by those who created, armed and directed these groups, and the support they receive from Pretoria is now a matter of public record. Although smaller groups were co-opted and armed by South Africa in order to cause destruction elsewhere in the region, the main thrust of ensuring regional dependence has been the disruption of transport links to ports in Angola and Mozambique. Captured documents, prisoners and ballistic tests have identified South Africa as the source of training, weapons and strategy for the destruction of economic targets, particularly those relating to SADCC.

Through its regional policy, South Africa seeks to recreate the safety of the old colonial buffer zone in a grouping of states with Pretoria at the centre, in order to maintain a dependence that will be economically lucrative and politically submissive - and act as a bulwark against the imposition of international sanctions. Although the most publicized version of destabilization is military, this military action masks political and economic goals.

The combination of tactics that South Africa uses against each of its neighbors depends on their individual political, economic and military vulnerabilities, from open military aggression against Angola and surrogate action in Mozambique and Angola, to sabotage of regional transportation routes, customs delays, border blockages and manipulation of rates as well as direct attacks, incursions, sabotage and car bombs in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia, economic pressure, kidnappings and assassinations in Lesotho and Swaziland.

This action has a ripple effect through the economic infrastructure of the target nation, whether indirectly by way of the extra resources which must be diverted to defence or directly through

infrastructure and other economic damage. An example in Mozambique is cement, formerly an export commodity produced at a Maputo factory drawing materials from a quarry south of the capital. However, the railway line linking the quarry and the factory was sabotaged in 1994 and several times thereafter, with the result that Mozambique no longer exports cement but spends valuable foreign currency importing clinker from South Africa. As a result, the local price of a tone of cement rose by more than 50%, and many jobs were lost. In addition, there was the dual economic effect of lost export revenue coupled with increased import expenditure. Meanwhile, South African companies have taken over Mozambique's regional export markets for cement.

These factors set the context within which South Africa's neighbors must manage their current economic difficulties.

Regional Economic Constraints

The particular economic strengths and weaknesses of each country were articulated at the meeting, and emphasis given to the common problems which stand out for each of them: declining commodity prices and thus export earnings, rising cost of imports, declining terms of trade, crippling debt service burdens, low rates of investment, and low or stagnant rates of growth with the resultant unemployment and decline in per capita income.

Declining commodity prices are beyond the reach of any one country's macro economic policy.

Diversification, however, is part of the response that governments are making as they experiment with new crop mixes and industrialization strategies in order to create jobs and increase exports. Some of those strategies depend upon new flows of investment or development assistance, which are often inadequate. Current debt servicing has meant that, for four of the countries, investment has fallen to new lows while external sources have receded. Mozambique, Malawi and Tanzania are pursuing stringent World Bank-IMF structural adjustment programs which call for severe demand constraint, further belt tightening, and privatization of their economies. Zambia withdrew its cooperation with the IMF on a programme of structural adjustment as a result of instability caused by the social consequences, after the lifting of subsidies caused a sharp escalation in the prices of basic foodstuffs. Canada and some Nordic countries have forgiven a good portion of Zambia's debt, but large amounts are still owed to the IMF and World Bank. Zambia cannot meet its payments and the IMF refuses to reschedule if payments are in arrears, so the debt remains.

Some of Zambia's other problems include its overdependence on one commodity (copper), an underdeveloped agricultural sector with few linkages to industry, and shortage of skilled personnel for administrative and technical efficiency. The internal management problems involved in steering its economy are severe, given the complications arising from world price fluctuations and heavy dependence on copper. When the copper price is low, economic planners in government call for internal restraint; upon occasion, the price then rises again and the financial sector loses credibility. When the price drops again, response is delayed by those who believe it will soon rise, and such delays increase the budget deficit with resultant further borrowing and cuts in revenue for social sectors such as health and education. It is also difficult to respond quickly to external shocks such as dramatic increases in the price of oil. The oil price increases of previous years had the opposite effect on the economy of Angola, which has a well developed petroleum extraction industry. The period of prosperity collapsed with the drop in oil revenue, exacerbated by the war and the related smuggling of valuable resources including diamonds, coffee, teak and ivory from the north-east and south of the country, most of which found its way to South Africa.

Botswana, in recent times the most economically successful country in the region, has one of the few commodities (diamonds) which are resilient in a world of declining commodity prices but an underdeveloped agricultural sector that requires importation of staple foods. Neighboring Zimbabwe, responsible for food security in the SADCC region, has created a food surplus and an early warning unit which produced its first drought assessment report in 1987.

Zimbabwe maintains a more elaborate economic infrastructure than its neighbors, but has suffered from the effects of being forced to use longer and more expensive transport routes through South Africa at a cost of roughly US\$105 million per annum, a total of over \$900 million since independence in early 1980. Zimbabwe also suffers the vastly increased defense cost of maintaining troops in Mozambique to protect its shortest transport routes to the sea through Beira. While defence as a percentage of Zimbabwe's total budget has remained constant since independence, in monetary terms it has increased by just under 300%.

These security problems confronting South Africa's neighbors have far reaching economic consequences. Defense budgets in most of the countries are higher than would be required in

time of peace and cause the diversion of scarce capital away from badly needed growth-generating industrialization policies nonagricultural diversification.

South Africa, while it does not import many goods from the SADCC region, earns considerable revenue from them beyond that which is earned by its exports to them. Revenues earned by South Africa in "invisibles" from the region have been variously estimated to be about \$10 billion during this decade. South Africa's trade surplus with the region is about \$1.5 billion a year. This point exposes the complexity and contradiction of South Africa's situation - it needs the region yet fears its potential strength as an independent entity. South Africa needs to maintain its market share, and control over major labour or capital movements, yet does all that is possible to sustain the hegemony of its own economy over that of the region.

South Africa's destabilization of regional economies has been selective - aimed at undermining the capacity of newly independent governments to govern, at demoralizing their people and thus their capacity to produce, and targeted at vital infrastructure so that South Africa's own facilities must be used. Estimates on the cost to the region of this destabilization vary, and, because human costs are inestimable, figures tell but a part of the story. Nevertheless, calculations of the cost of defence, damage and lost development now begin conservatively at \$35 billion and one recent study puts the figure at almost \$60 billion at current rates of exchange. That figure was put into perspective at Juliasdale when the point was made that it is three times the size of the foreign debt of the SADCC region, which is \$18 billion.

Namibia - Hostage Economy

Namibia, too, is hostage to historical economic patterns. A former German colony which South Africa sought to annex under a mandate granted to the British crown in 1919, to be exercised through the government of the then Union of South Africa, Namibia has been on the agenda of the United Nations since its inception in 1946. The UN assumed responsibility for Namibia by resolution in 1966, but South Africa refused to relinquish control. An agreement signed in December 1988 suggests that internationally supervised elections could be held in the territory before the end of 1989. However, it was noted that political independence will not automatically bring economic independence.

Namibia is part of the rand monetary zone; its economy, based on mineral exports, is an extension of South Africa's and most commercial decisions are made in Pretoria. There is no manufacturing sector to speak of, agriculture has been virtually ignored other than at subsistence level, and its small population lacks indigenous skilled personnel. The South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) has been maintaining an international lobby, as well as fighting a guerrilla war, against South African occupation of Namibia since 1966.

South Africa's Siege Economy - the Weakening Giant

Within South Africa itself, the economy is increasingly under siege experiencing significant pressures from disinvestment and the application of selective sanctions, its inability to regain access to foreign capital markets, the cost of maintaining its bureaucracy, the falling price of gold and decline in value of the rand. An estimated \$10 billion worth of capital has left South Africa since 1985.

As South Africa's economy - conceived in colonial times as the engine for the region - weakens under the impact of sanctions, disinvestment and military adventurism, it impacts adversely on the regional economy. Buying few goods and services from the region and providing weaker financial intermediation, it becomes a drag line pulling the region away from growth. Since the region clearly sees no end to its development problems until apartheid is gone, this process has not weakened the regional commitment to sanctions.

South Africa is now seen as a weakening giant, experiencing serious declines in its growth rate, a depreciating currency, and a drying up of credit for its capital-hungry investment plans. Real GDP has fallen from its annual average of 5.8 in the 1960s to 1.8 in the eight years to 1987, much below a needed growth rate of 5% if per capita incomes are to increase. Given the population growth rate, the current low rate of growth means in fact a sharply declining standard of living for those at the upper levels of the economic spectrum in South Africa. Meanwhile, black unemployment ranges from 30-75 % depending upon the location.

A new major study of the international financial system in relation to South Africa, prepared by an Inter-Governmental Group of the Commonwealth, notes that "one by one international lenders have closed their door to South Africa and multinational investors are pulling out". The costs of maintaining apartheid are escalating and there are those within South Africa, particularly in the business community, who have begun to say so.

The regional disparity in southern Africa is evident in the figures of GDP in relation to population and land area, as the following Table indicates. South Africa in southern

Africa has almost 76% of the wealth of the region yet less than 18 % of the land and 31 % of the population.

<u>Table 1</u>	<u>Southern</u>	1984: area, population, and GDP				per capita
	<u>Africa,</u>	Area	population	Pop density	GDP	GDP/capita
		<u>*1000</u>	<u>million</u>	<u>present/km</u>	<u>\$bn</u>	<u>\$)</u>
	<u>sq.km</u>					
Angola	1217	9.9	8	4.7	470	
Botswana	600	1.0	2	1.0	990	
Lesotho	30	1.5	50	0.4	240	
Malawi	188	6.8	58	1.1	160	
Mozambique	802	13.4	17	2.8	210	
Swaziland	17	0.7	41	0.6	770	
Tanzania	945	21.5	23	4.4	200	
Zambia	753	6.4	8	2.6	410	
Zimbabwe	391	8.1	21	4.6	570	
Namibia	824	1.1	1	1.2	1 100	
The Ten	5 727	69.3	12	23.4	330	
South Africa	1221	31.6	26	73.4	2300"	
Southern Africa	6948	102.0	1.5	96.8	950	

Source: Lewis, 1987.

*Figures are for 1983.

PART 11
Total Strategy, Total Response
Total Strategy

The concept of "total strategy", adopted by South Africa in an attempt to quell internal dissent and maintain regional economic hegemony, involves the coordination of political, economic, diplomatic and military strategies. "Total strategy" was defined in a 1977 Defence White Paper which advocated the promotion of "political and economic collaboration" in the region through a "solid military balance" and through economic and other "action in relation to transport services, distribution and telecommunications".

As a result of this strategy, some southern African countries are facing an onslaught which has caused the destruction of schools, health and administrative centers; the disruption of the main arteries of transport, industrial and other economic installations; and the displacement of entire village populations. Mozambique and Angola have borne the brunt of this but it was evident at the Juliasdale meeting that the international community is becoming aware of their plight. The overall cost to the region may never be known, an accumulation over 13 years of war damage, extra defence expenditure, higher transport and energy costs, lost export revenue, greater import costs, lost production and foreign investment, reduced economic growth, displacement of people, destruction of marl infrastructure and environment, and related smuggling.

The human and social impact is difficult to quantify. In Mozambique, over 2,700 schools have been destroyed or closed as a result of attacks, depriving half a million pupils of education, with all of the implications that has for the future. Some 200 teachers have been killed, almost as many kidnapped, and over 3,000 dislocated. Angola has some 40,000 amputees, many of whom trod on landmines in the paths to their fields.

Even the environment is a victim, with future costs of animal poaching, ivory smuggling and tree felling yet to be dealt with. South Africa's regional wars have cost at least one million lives since 1981 and, as with the cost estimates, the figure may be much higher. These deaths were caused directly by war or occurred as a result of war, through the destruction of rural medical clinics and emergency food supplies, disruption of vaccination campaigns, dislocation of communities and loss of food production. The UNICEF report, *Children on the Frontline*, published almost two years ago, said that over half a million children under five had died in Mozambique and Angola from war-related causes. With other war-related or direct war deaths in both countries in the ensuing two years and a similar infant mortality rate, the result of South Africa's military action over the past eight years is over one million dead, more than half being children under five.

A US state department official has described the situation in Mozambique as "a systematic and brutal war of terror against innocent Mozambican civilians through forced labour, starvation, physical abuse and wanton killing.... one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War Two." And a study prepared for the State Department said: "that the accounts are so strikingly similar by refugees who have fled from northern, central and southern Mozambique suggests that the violence is systematic and coordinated and not a series of spontaneous, isolated incidents by undisciplined combatants."

As a result of South Africa's actions, over three million people in the bordering region are displaced from their homes, and three times that number are reliant on emergency food aid. Almost two million of those displaced are within their own national boundaries, having fled from their land in fear of their lives, losing relatives and belongings. Well over one million others have crossed international boundaries, stretching support systems for food and clothing, health and education.

By early 1988, those affected in Mozambique alone totalled 5.9 million, a staggering figure. And behind those numbers lies the suffering of individual people, displaced and bereaved and often hungry. The problems of resettlement and reintegration cover a broad spectrum of physical and psychological problems. This massive displacement of people, although it requires emergency relief, is not a 'natural disaster' but part of a deliberate strategy, and any consideration of solutions must take this into account.

The economic strategy has been to destroy infrastructure, increase reliance on South African rail and port facilities, and where possible deepen the reach of South African capital and financial control. The vulnerability of neighbouring states is bound up in the economic and military

sabotage of their transportation network. In the past decade, South Africa has directly destroyed, or supported groups who have destroyed, four of the five regional rail lines outside its borders. The security strategy has created insecurity, coupled with a political strategy to undermine the capacities of the Frontline states and the SADC region to govern, and to be seen to be able to govern. This hampers their capacity to raise investment and development assistance by projecting an image of political and economic instability. Information is central to the functioning of this strategy. Public opinion in Western countries depends heavily upon television news and daily press. Media restrictions and censorship have effectively pulled the plug on the coverage of events inside South Africa. Recent negotiations on Angola and Namibia, or rapprochement in Mozambique, have added to the misimpression, particularly among Europeans and North Americans, that peace in the region is just around the corner. This misinformation provides a perfect blind behind which destabilization continues and apartheid buys more time to rearrange itself.

Total Response

While the SADC countries share the recovery problems of the rest of the continent, these are exacerbated by the geographical reality of South Africa's policy of apartheid and by its "total strategy" for maintaining, often violently, its economic hegemony. The economic difficulties of the region, therefore, can be overcome only by a total response from an informed international community. This concept was the major finding of the Juliasdale meeting, hence the title of this report which, having detailed the component parts of South Africa's strategy, will make policy recommendations arising from the deliberations for an urgently needed response from the international community.

The contradictory, diverse and often divisive nature of the international community's response to southern Africa's pain allows South Africa's strategy to be effective, particularly where it is openly supported by some powerful Western members. For example, the US Congress maintains restrictions on development assistance to Mozambique while the UK supports rehabilitation and defense of the transport sector. For Mozambique, more than anywhere else in the region, the international response has been too little and too late. The economy and environment are ravaged, much of the rural population is malnourished or displaced. Other Frontline States and developing countries have assisted, sharing meager economic and military resources, but the scale of the tragedy is such that Mozambique has had few survival choices. When the question of sanctions is raised, the polarities change. The US Congress and others have imposed selected sanctions while the UK has opposed mandatory sanctions. Furthermore, some members of the European Economic Community (EEC) violate internationally mandated restrictions on arms sales to South Africa, transferring technology that allows Pretoria to develop its arms industry and expand export of arms.

Just as South Africa has approached its strategy for sustaining regional control comprehensively opposition to those policies must be equally strategic and comprehensive encompassing economics, security, politics and information. This response should involve an integrated approach setting out organizational coordination of the component parts for optimum results. The benefits of this approach would be felt in the economic recovery of the region with fewer contradictions to efficient development, and would unleash the productive capacity of the subcontinent. The main obstacle to this vision of prosperity is South Africa's policy of apartheid and regional destabilization.

Southern Africa is in ferment. At peace, the region could play a major role in international trade, offering secure resources and growing markets to the world economy. The southern African region has the potential to become an instrument for economic transformation in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, given the wealth and diversity of its natural resources, the vast potential of its human resources, and the good physical and social infrastructure in many of its countries. The question is how to harmonize the rush of events and changes to ensure that these produce rapid and positive results.

PART III

Toward Economic Recovery and Development

Southern Africa is economically and financially interdependent and thus the major problems of the region cannot be confronted without taking account of South Africa's economic and political policies as well as those of the SADC region. This requires a firm commitment by the international community, in consultation with the SADC region, to a short and long term strategy, in tandem with the SADC Programme of Action on regional development priorities

but seeking a broad international commitment to debt relief, expansion of trading patterns and other measures.

Action is needed at every level - by local community leaders to inform people about southern Africa, by national decision-makers in legislatures and executive offices as they monitor public policies in assistance, trade, and sanctions, and by the international community working through international meetings and institutions.

At the international level, action is needed at the highest levels from both the United Nations and the World Bank taking full advantage of their past programme involvement within southern Africa and their respective organizational mandates for resolving challenges confronting the region.

In the United Nations, this leadership should come from a small office to be set up by the Secretary-General through his Special Adviser on Africa. This office, with its direct access to the Secretary General could serve as the catalyst and coordinator for a large range of UN actions in southern Africa including a major information programme, monitoring destabilization and mobilizing pressure to stop it, Security Council consideration of sanctions, etc.

For the World Bank, working directly with SADCC, this should mean stepping up efforts to mobilize and coordinate, major donor support for economic development and debt relief, strengthening each of the SADCC designated sectors, and deepening institutional capacity for long term regional development. The UNDP and other operational agencies of the United Nations involved in the SADCC region should coordinate their activities on a regional basis. Since certain aspects of South Africa's regional economic policy are implemented violently, donor assistance to the region must take account of the integral aspects involving defence and security. Pressure to eliminate apartheid must be exerted in conjunction with international political and financial support for the SADCC region, and immediate action must be taken to improve the flow of information and thus perceptions of the political economy of the region. The above outlines the main findings of the Juliasdale roundtable and, although each proposal did not necessarily evoke the support of all participants, a number of general and specific actions were proposed. Thus the presentation of recommendations is in two parts, one dealing with general guidelines and the second more specific.

General Guidelines and Recommendations

Economic

Economic support for the SADCC region requires a multi-faceted approach to trade and access to markets, debt relief, development assistance, emergency aid, and support for sanctions against South Africa. Structural adjustment of these economies will be prolonged and painful, and will not succeed unless the international community provides sufficient financial and other assistance to reduce the severity of adjustment measures and the accompanying political and social tensions. Most countries in the region have potential agricultural and mineral wealth. However, much of it is undeveloped and is likely to remain so until greater regional stability is achieved, and with it, the likelihood of increased local and foreign investment.

There are many problems that each individual nation can address, including high population growth, reassessment of agricultural policies, and human resources development. However it must be clear that economic recovery in southern Africa is a function of many factors, some of them beyond national efforts and international support through aid alone.

a) Trade and access to markets

Trading opportunities for the SADCC region are timed, as protectionism in the industrialized nations greatly reduces the possibilities. Much development assistance has had to go into agricultural development for purposes of food security, and some countries have been able to diversify into new cash crops or to increase the processing of existing crops. This creates the potential for expanding export markets (although fresh produce requires costly refrigerated storage and transportation). Efforts must be exerted to overcome economic and traditional barriers to trade within the region, and to gain access to markets in northern industrialized countries or within other newly industrializing countries.

Gaining access to markets is a complex process. Some manufactured goods encounter international cartels and hence cannot be sold abroad. For example, Zimbabwe produces cotton, tobacco and cattle, and sustains an efficient manufacturing sector for these materials, producing clothes, cigarettes, shoes and other leather goods. However, many export markets for these manufactured goods are blocked by international cartels, and Zimbabwe is forced to sell or barter raw materials rather than expanding its manufacturing sector and increasing export earnings by processing locally for sale abroad.

b) Debt relief

The debt crisis must be seen as a pervasive and deep-seated problem whose durable resolution must lie, in the final analysis, in the subordination of debt service to growth. The situation cannot be allowed to continue in which countries divert overwhelming proportions of their resources to service debt at the expense of growth, a recipe for disaster that has already disrupted the fragile economies of developing countries and threatens the security of the international financial system.

Debt relief is a key element of economic strategy. Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania have undertaken stringent reforms and, given their commitment and their special problems, they should be given urgent consideration for debt relief. Zambia, while trying to restructure its economy, has been denied IMF assistance because of payment arrears. The granting of a period of grace on these arrears would be appropriate encouragement to economic advancement. However, the debt crisis is now so serious that the international community must begin to consider new formulas for granting credit. Government officials and influential leaders of organizations such as the Commonwealth, the United Nations, and the Organization of African Unity should through their contacts try to place on the agenda of relevant international fora proposals for a coordinated programme of debt relief. Debt forgiveness for destabilized countries is long overdue. It would free resources for development and provide momentum towards reducing dependence on the international community for aid. At least that portion of debt due in emergency food imports and security outlays should be forgiven. That practice - debt forgiveness for food and security needs - has often been followed in Asian emergencies. Southern African countries deserve the same consideration.

c) Development assistance

While the international community has committed development assistance to the region (Table A, Appendix I), the levels, especially when reduced by debt service payments, do not approach that which is required to reverse the consequences of destabilization. Further, much of that development assistance is programmed without reference to the regional context within which it is expected to be effective. Yet the complex interdependency of southern Africa must be factored into development assistance programmes and structural adjustment lending. While designing and implementing programmes and projects within one SADCC member state, attention must be paid to the consequences of that project or programme for other SADCC members.

Development assistance flows to the SADCC region have not kept up with the Rowel resources out of the region for debt servicing, nor do they compensate for the losses resulting from depressed commodity prices. If the cost of destabilization is factored into the equation, the flow of resources is clearly inadequate. The region receives approximately \$2.5 billion a year (net disbursements) in development assistance from the international community. Spread among nine countries and over nine sectors, and heavily encumbered with covenants and conditions, this assistance is insufficient to the development needs of the region.

Fortunately the region has a special institution in SADCC which, in its short history, has become an important force for regional development. A lean, decentralized organization, SADCC functions largely through the nine country sectoral bodies throughout the region, as well as through its own secretariat. SADCC has developed a comprehensive Programme of Action which identifies projects in all sectors awaiting mom support.

SADCC has proven its skill in marshalling and deploying support for regional rail and port facilities, and many other key development activities. Mozambique's ports and railways are being repaired and upgraded, as is the Tanzania-Zambia railway system. Similar plans are underway to repair the Benguela line to Lobito. Telecommunications facilities have been restructured so they no longer require relay through South Africa.

The World Bank is one of the largest donors to the region. Yet the Bank does not currently include analysis of the regional context when designing new projects and programmes. A commendable exception to this generalization is the recent Bank project to facilitate institutional strengthening of SADCC. The World Bank should determine ways of moving beyond its micro level focus on insular projects to a broader perspective on regional development.

d) Emergency aid

Urgent international action is required, in concert with the countries of the region, to provide food, medical supplies and agricultural inputs, to upgrade local seed production, to improve distribution, to facilitate resettlement and a return to normal production. However, two development-related points should be taken into account in the provision of emergency assistance.

The first is that due to South Africa's selective methods of economic and military sabotage, emergency assistance is required mainly by two countries in the region. Others, although subject

to Pretoria's sabotage and economic sanctions, are able to produce food and manufacture goods. Where possible, food and emergency supplies should be purchased from within the region to strengthen regional economies. In some cases, the country in need can produce its own surplus if distribution can be improved, thus reducing transport costs and stimulating an existing local industry, such as dried fish in Mozambique.

The second development-related point, about emergency aid coming from outside the region, is that it is essential to ship it through regional ports and transportation routes, thus injecting transportation fees into the region rather than further strengthening the South African economy through use of its ports. At present, as South Africa batters the region, emergency traffic transits its ports and railways, supplementing its Income to continue to cause destruction.

Security

A more sophisticated international understanding of the relationships between security, defense and development in southern Africa is critically needed. The terms "lethal" and "non-lethal" with their military connotations confuse rather than clarify these complex relationships. As civilians are most often the target for destabilization, those items needed by civilians to retain dignity and productivity are as much a part of security as they are of development - for example, hoes, boots, blankets, protective coverings for trucks, windows, safe passage for emergency foods, etc.

Policy-makers must be apprised of the need for security as an integral part of development in the region. Conflicts spill over borders: directly in the form of large numbers of people displaced from their homes, stretching resources in neighboring states; or indirectly in snarled transportation systems, stalled supply lines and disruption of trade. One of the main challenges to development in the region is to convey an awareness of the need to achieve security. The Palme Commission concluded in 1987 that, "Upholding the territorial integrity of the Frontline states requires a far greater commitment from outside the African continent. Development and defense are inextricably inter-related and mutually supportive."

Some members of the international community have come forward with security assistance in an apparent effort to avoid enacting sanctions against South Africa. Although their help is much appreciated in the region, this does not help to remove the cause of the problem. However their position has been strengthened by the reluctance of traditional development partners to come forward with security assistance. It was reiterated in the strongest terms at Juliasdale that aid is not a substitute for sanctions, and that sanctions must be accompanied by sustained international support for aid to the SADCC region.

The past frequent violations of the international embargo on sales of military equipment and technology to South Africa call attention to a cruel hypocrisy prevalent in the West. Currently, victims of South Africa's aggression lack the same access to suppliers that South Africa itself is able to obtain - that is, while arms continue to flow to South Africa, victims' pleas for security assistance are rebuffed as generating violence. To begin undoing this hypocrisy requires, first, stringent enforcement of the international embargo on arms sales to South Africa, and second, protective support for those victimized by past arms sales.

Political

An active political response requires an informed international public opinion and coordinated political leadership in local communities, nations and international organizations. Some agencies become involved because it is their job to do so while others, including governments, become involved through self interest or humanitarian interest, both of *which* can be fleeting and unreliable. The most reliable form of assistance is that motivated by a sense of solidarity based on the conviction that we are all human beings on the same fundamentally interdependent planet.

a) Leadership

One international organization that has played a leading role in awakening international consciousness to the reality of southern Africa and increasing pressure for an end to apartheid is the Commonwealth and its secretariat. The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) riveted attention on South Africa as no other external group has done, and through visiting institutions in every capital they reached important audiences which would otherwise not have been moved. This is the kind of leadership that is needed by other such constituencies.

Another initiative representing innovation and leadership is that of the Africa Fund. Set up by the Non-Aligned Movement during its summit in Zimbabwe in 1986, this fund mobilizes support from a large number of countries *for projects* in solidarity with the Frontline States and the SADCC region. It provides an example of the kind of practical south cooperation that can make a contribution to current emergency and development needs and to reconstruction in the region.

Among the fastest growing group of facilitators in international development are the hundreds of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) within the SADCC region and within industrialized countries, and it is to these organizations and individuals that the region can turn for outreach into local communities all over the world.

Within the UN system, the multiplicity of organizations that work in southern Africa means that a focal point for international coordination is becoming increasingly important. Just as the African drought elicited the importance of creating an Office of Emergency Operations for Africa, so too is a focal point needed for mobilizing international efforts toward southern Africa in close cooperation with the SADCC region.

b) Namibia

One reason that UN organizational issues warrant attention is due to the role that the UN will play in any internationally recognized transition to independence in Namibia. With so many national interests involved in the process, Pretoria could use the opportunity to play upon organizational rivalries and competing interests of UN agencies to its own advantage.

South Africa's neighbors are sceptical of its willingness to respect commitments even to formal, signed agreements, and cite previous violations. One example was the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in 1984, another was the Lusaka Accord with Angola the same

year. According to a recent UN report, South Africa has been spending more than \$1.5 million per day on its military activities in Namibia: if Pretoria is now under enough economic and other pressure to proceed with an internationally acceptable election process in Namibia (this was by no means clear at the time of the meeting), then steps must be taken to ensure that the process is free and fair.

There are many similarities and differences with Zimbabwe's transition almost nine years ago, and some lessons to be remembered. First, the UK had overall responsibility for navigating the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe. Second, there were election observers from many other countries and organizations, notably the Commonwealth whose observer group played a particularly important part. Third, the proposed transitional period in Namibia is far longer than that in Zimbabwe, and is thus fraught with even more possibilities for disruption.

Already in northern Namibia, films and videos are being shown from mobile trucks depicting malnourished and starving people suffering during the drought in Sudan and Ethiopia but carrying the message from Pretoria that similar results could be expected if Swapo were to win an election. In addition, there are reports of large numbers of Angolans being resettled in northern Namibia by the South African authorities. The most obvious reasons for this would be to fraudulently alter the election outcome and, since most speak the same local language as many Swapo cadres, to prepare pseudo groups for disruption during a ceasefire and after. Destabilization flourishes under the cover of silence, with the shield of press restrictions and little international attention.

Keeping the spotlight on Namibia is central to any transition process.

Most organizations which support independence for Namibia, including the UN, are not well established within the country and will need to create reliable logistics and networks. Meanwhile, South Africa has installed structures in Namibia that include a civil service, a police force and a military force, the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF). In addition, South Africa is retaining Namibia's only developed commercial port, Walvis Bay, and its military base there from which it staged a massive naval exercise in September 1988.

c) Sanctions

The prospect of South Africa as a weakening giant underscores the special role of sanctions, disinvestment and other types of pressure against apartheid, and the role that comprehensive and mandatory sanctions would have in hastening the process of change. South Africa is highly vulnerable to sanctions, given the pattern of exports and the dependence on international trade. The sanctions enacted to date have been effective in raising the cost of maintaining apartheid, even in mobilizing the local business community (which opposes sanctions) to actively seek other solutions, including meetings with the African National Congress (ANC).

Trade sanctions have been effective in raising import costs and forcing South Africa to look for new markets. For coal, the biggest foreign exchange earner after gold, the export volume dropped 15% in 1987, the first year of trade sanctions. Export earnings plunged by \$500 million to about \$1 billion. However, the most effective sanctions have been those imposed by the international business and financial community which restricted access to investment and foreign trade credits.

Although South Africa opposes sanctions, it is implementing its own form of economic pressure against its neighbors. In addition, the military aspects of destabilization, now well documented, clearly show that South Africa is a "threat to international peace and security". Although this is a prerequisite for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions in the terminology of the UN, this action remains elusive.

The contraction of the South African economy adds leverage to the power of those seeking to end apartheid. However, the probability of greater internal and regional disruption makes it imperative that industrialized countries and international institutions provide appropriate and concrete assistance to the Frontline States and the SADCC region to sustain their recovery and development, to reduce dependence, and to strengthen their capacity to absorb shocks from the south. Attempts by the SADCC region to reach out to the international community for new trade and investment relations must be encouraged, and efforts to diversify their economies supported.

Sanctions are only one aspect of what must be a multi-faceted approach to resolving the main problem facing the region. New, imaginative plans are necessary to increase internal pressure on the South African regime by exposing a broader range of the population to alternatives, and by creating conditions outside the country for discussions which are not presently possible inside.

Information

History will have to record that the international community has been shockingly silent about the devastating impact of destabilization on the people of the region and their economies. The complexity of this region - its linkages, its peoples, and its problems - is not widely understood. International action, therefore, requires, above all, a large-scale and concerted effort to inform people within industrialized, and newly industrializing, countries about the need for peace and justice in this part of the world.

The circulation of accurate information within and outside the region is essential. One benefit of improving the flow of information about the region is in countering the distorted information put out by Pretoria's well-financed campaign. However, by no means should it be a reactive strategy. The dissemination of information should include a positive approach to informing public opinion, investors, media, international agencies, and NGOs about the resources and resilience of the countries within the region, and the prospects for a more prosperous future.

In many countries, perceptions of the region are often based on limited or distorted information. An example of this is the recent negotiations concerning Angola and Namibia, and the visit by the South African president to three African countries, which added to the misimpression, particularly among Europeans and North Americans, that peace is just around the corner. Yet in late 1988 the conflict in Mozambique was escalating rapidly throughout the country; and in Angola, where the agreement initiated by South Africa, Angola and Cuba does not cover proxy groups, the conflict continues.

While education efforts must take place in Europe and North America, there are other influential actors to consider, such as Japan, which is now South Africa's largest single trading partner. A showing of the film "Cry Freedom" to some 200 members of the Japanese Diet (parliament) was followed by increased activity toward reducing trade with South Africa. The power of information can be seen clearly in Sweden where 77% of a well-informed population support sanctions as a means of increasing pressure to end apartheid.

Statistics are an aspect of information that can be easily distorted or misused depending upon how they are conveyed. An example of this is the latest South African figures for black unemployment, showing a relatively low figure because the numbers do not include areas of high unemployment such as the "homelands". Health figures, such as those for tuberculosis, are often distorted in the same way.

The media is only one purveyor of information. Among others, the educational system in various countries may or may not instill in its students a sense of global interdependence and regional realities. One method of monitoring effectiveness would be the use of polls and surveys in various countries, similar to those used by UNICEF, and in Sweden and other countries.

The North South Roundtable has an important role to play in the exchange of ideas and information, and cites this as its main area of impact during the first decade of its existence: to disseminate information, clarify issues, and articulate policy choices. These are the prime goals of an organization which is part public educator, part individual debating forum and part think tank.

Conclusion - Agenda for Action

ECONOMIC

- A small office for mobilizing an integrated international response to economic recovery and development in southern Africa should be established by the UN Secretary-General through his Special Adviser on Africa.

Economic recovery and development should be the subject of a working group charged with planning an international conference on Global Support for Southern Africa. This should be coordinated by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Africa and involve a broad range of elements including debt relief, tariffs and trade, increased development and emergency assistance, investment, and pressure for removal of the greatest obstacle to regional development: apartheid. Such a conference should produce concrete arrangements for implementation of the UN Programme on African Recovery that emerged from the General Assembly's Special Session on Africa. and should be geared toward helping SADCC states to restructure existing patterns of trade and production in the region, particularly among themselves. These patterns are deeply entrenched and redesigning them will be a costly but necessary contribution to short and long term development.

An underlying theme of such a conference should be to increase the economic growth and independence of the SADCC region and reduce dependence on South Africa. Discussion of development aid should be based on increasing flows to the region through the SADCC Programme of Action, as well as through bilateral programmes. Given SADCC's special role in regional development, the working group must include the SADCC Executive Secretary as well as other representatives from the region. Action toward these goals should also involve other groups and individuals, business and political leaders, major donors and NGOs. For those states in the region which are able to disengage their trading links with South Africa, assistance should be given by alternative countries of origin in the form of subsidies (1) to compensate the extra costs of alternative sources of imports and (2) to reduce tariff barriers on exports. A thorough study on these alternatives should be prepared, together with a plan of action.

A commitment should be elicited from international donors to purchase supplies where possible from within the SADCC region, and to use regional ports and transportation routes rather than those of South Africa when sending assistance from outside the region.

Government officials and influential leaders should through their contacts try to place on the agenda of relevant international fora proposals for a coordinated programme of debt relief. The first such occasion is the SADCC Annual Consultative Conference in Luanda at the end of January, 1989. The summit of the seven western industrialized nations is scheduled for February, the OAU summit in mid-year, and later in the year the summit of Non-Aligned leaders in Belgrade and the Commonwealth Heads Of Government Meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

SECURITY

That defense is an integral part of development in southern Africa must be portrayed to international audiences, and terminology should exclude words such as "lethal" and "non-lethal" which evoke militaristic images. Traditional supporters must be encouraged toward more involvement in the security aspect of development assistance.

For some, there is a difficult political and moral issue to address, i.e. the access of the aggressor to military equipment and technology from outside the country despite an international embargo, while the victims lack protection for the movement of food and other emergency supplies. The Non-Aligned Movement through the Africa Fund is leading by example, recently concluding an agreement to supply \$2,6 million worth of spare parts for boats and for rehabilitation of the Limpopo railway.

Global action must be mobilized by governments, NGOs and individuals, against South African aggression across the Limpopo and Orange rivers, a situation which never would have been allowed to happen in Europe.

POLITICAL

Taking into account preparations already in place for destabilization in Namibia and the institutional fragility of the few independent groups within the country, it will be necessary to mobilize a comprehensive network of observers should the plan for a transition to independence be implemented. The existing church network is one aspect of this, and another is the mobilization of as many as possible of the international observers involved in the Zimbabwe transition, playing a different role but bringing the experience of that period. These could include some of the British civil servants who monitored constituencies, and even some of the British policemen who took up positions at each polling station, serving as a useful symbol as well as keeping watch over the ballot boxes. A key element would be members of the Commonwealth observer group who played an important role in the Zimbabwe transition, and

some members of the EPG could be useful in giving such a group a higher profile. The Frontline States should supply skilled personnel as technical advisers, administrators and election observers, as should the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement, international organizations, and NGOs.

-An essential element is the mobilization of adequate funding to ensure that a UN military contingent is of the size originally envisaged. It is essential that it not be reduced through financial constraints as this will affect its own strength and security as well as its ability to monitor a ceasefire. Financial assistance will also be needed for the resettlement of refugees.

-Sanctions must be widened and tightened, and breaches monitored, not as a "punitive" measure against South Africa but rather to increase pressure for an end to apartheid and the suffering it is causing. The extensive research being done by the Commonwealth should be broadly circulated and widely used, and this is an area in which individuals, NGOs, trade unions and other groups can be mobilized to assist. To this end, a small working group of those governments and agencies supporting sanctions could be convened to broaden the strategy.

-Detailed evidence of South African military aggression against the region should be circulated as widely as possible, and should be presented to the UN Security Council to show the "threat to international peace and security", thereby increasing pressure for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions.

-Application of sanctions must be accompanied by positive compensatory measures by the international community to fortify, strengthen and develop the economies of the frontline states and the SADCC region to assist them in their efforts to reduce their dependence on South Africa and to withstand any retaliation. In this regard, special assistance must be planned and financed for Lesotho.

INFORMATION

There should be a broader circulation of accurate information concerning the region, both for the purpose of counteracting South African propaganda and disinformation, and to convey an appropriate image of the regional context. While the media is one vehicle for this dissemination, it is by no means the only one. To exchange ideas and identify possible courses of action, a small working group of interested individuals should meet as soon as possible. This meeting should be convened within the region and action must include an improvement in the use and availability of information within the region.

Among the purposes of such action would be (1) to alter the regional perspective of donors, investors and visitors, (2) to retain the often fleeting world interest in the problems of the region, and (3) to heighten awareness of the interlocking nature of human and ecological damage to the region.

Finally, in keeping with the objectives of the North-South Roundtable and the unique role it plays in feeding information and ideas into the process of policy reformulation, and because the circumstances of southern Africa are fluid and rapidly changing, the NSRT should organize another consultative meeting on southern Africa before the end of 1989, preferably in Angola. A total response to the total strategy deployed by South Africa is long overdue, and the international community must play a major role in the development and deployment of this response. All nations will have to work in concert on a set of problems of great complexity which will require the mustering of considerable determination and organizational capacity. Consider, however, the possibilities. Southern Africa with its extraordinary potential could become the place to restart the engine of growth for the whole of the subcontinent. It has exceptional leadership in several countries. It has rich mineral and human resources. What the people of southern Africa have not had, however, is concerted international support for a programme of social justice and development.

The tragedy of failing to confront this challenge already is a human catastrophe equaling the horror of the holocaust. To remain silent, or inactive, will be to have become accomplices to these crimes against humanity. The atrocities of apartheid will cast a long shadow over human history of this period. Children and grand children one day will query what we knew of the suffering in southern Africa, and what we did with that knowledge. Now is the hour to determine the answer to be given.

Table A
**Not official Development Assistance (ODA) to
 SADCC Countries 1985 (\$ millions)**

	<u>Angola</u>	<u>Botswana</u>	<u>Lesotho</u>	<u>Malawi</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Swaziland</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>	<u>Zimbabwe</u>	<u>Total</u>
United states	7.0	11.0	190	60	07.0	8.0	20.0	940	360	2100
Sweden	18.7	7.3	69	0	31.0	0.6	09.0	22,9	23.5	1629
World Bank	0	-0.2	7.8	327	5.0	-0.1	28.5	660	4.2	117.9
West Germany	2.5	17.2	8.2	119	4.9	1.7	32,9	18.7	27.3	121.2
European Community	7.2	28	7.3	10,9	25.4	20	299	29.1	3.9	118.7
Netherlands	1.1	21	0.8	26	21.8	0.4	369	15.7	17.7	109.1
Norway	0.7	11.1	0.1	0.3	21.2	0.2	151	167	8.7	101.3
United Kingdom	0,2	6.3	3.1	13.9	9.4	0.8	22.6	22.8	21.6	101.7
Japan	0	0	07	1.9	44	0.8	28.3	41.7	8.3	89.1
My	16.7	0	0,7	0.1	28.0	03	34.8	1.3	7.3	19.0
CII&	1.8	4.9	5.1	4.7	4.8	4.4	30.4	10.9	17.3	879 1
Denmark	Q9	2.2	1.1	3.1	6.1	0	37.0	6.2	60	651
Finland	0.2	0	0.5	0	7.2	0	166	11.8	4.5	36.9
France	1.4	Q7	0.2	7.2	20.7	0.7	1.5	0.7	3.3	33.6
Other Bilateral	2.2	3.9	6.9	44	15.2	0.3	27.0	10.4	5.1	11.4
Other Multilateral	24.7	71.5	24.3	163	46.6	5.7	45,9	18.4	17.4	230.8
Tad	91.5	96.4	94.4	113.0	300.2	25.4	486.9	328.9	237.1	1,773.8

Sources: OBCD, Geographical Distribution of financial Flow Developing Countries 1984 and 1987.
 Net ODA Means: actual disbursements minus repayments. Repayments account for negative figures in some columns

Table developed by peter H%om

APPENDIX II

Participants

[All participants attended in their personal capacities. Participants' affiliations given here are those at the time of the meeting and not necessarily their present affiliations.]

Alain Azouaou

First Counselor, Embassy of France Zimbabwe

Nita Barrow

Permanent Representative For Barbados at the United Nations, New York

Coralie Bryant (Rapporteur)

Fellow, Overseas Development Council Washington -

William Carmichael

Vice-President, Developing Countries Programs Ford Foundation, New York

Gaositwe Chiepe

Minister for External Affairs, Botswana

Bernard Chidzero (Co-Chair)

Senior Minister, Ministry of Finance,

Economic Planning & Development, Zimbabwe President SID Zimbabwe

Chitsaka Chipaziwa

Assistant Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zimbabwe

Djibril Diallo

Senior Adviser to Executive Director UNICEF, New York

Peggy Dulaney

President, Synergos Institute, New York

Frank Ferrari

Acting President, African American Institute New York

Wayne Fredericks

Vice-Chairman, Overseas Development Council Washington

Kai Helenius

Under-Secretary of State for International Development Affairs Helsinki, Finland

Ken Ikebe

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Ambassador Krishnan

Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of India in charge of the Africa Fond, New Delhi

Stephen Lewis

Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa United Nations, New York

David Martin (Rapporteur)

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Michael Ramsay Melhuish

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Mr Ralf M Mohs

Ministerial Counsellor Federal Republic of Germany

Luke Mwamansbiku

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zambia

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Henry Lapani N'gombe

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UNICEF Area Representative Zimbabwe and Lesotho

Me Pholo

Permanent Secretary, Military Council, Lesotho

Ole Lonsmann Paulsen

Ambassador, Under-Secretary Foreign, Ministry, Denmark

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Member of Military Council, Lesotho responsible for Manpower and Economic Development

Shridath Ramphal

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Assistant Director, Economic Affairs Commonwealth Secretariat, London

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Director Programming and Systems Anglophone African Branch Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

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Andimba Taivo ya Taivo

Secretary General, SWAPO

Maurice William

Secretary General, SID

Francis Wilson

Professor, University of Cape Town South Africa

APPENDIX III

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APPENDIX IV

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Human Development, Adjustment and Growth, ed. Khadija Haq and Uner Kirdar, 1987, 326 pp.

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